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Abstract
Between 2003 and 2013, according to Zephyr (BvD) data, 22% of M&A deals between banks
have involved state-owned banks, either as targets (12%) or as acquirers (10%). The behavior of
state-owned banks in the market control is, however, under-researched. The standard Inefficient
Management Hypothesis suggests that more efficient managerial teams target less performing
firms. The IMH, however, has never been tested for deals involving state-owned banks, nor the
pre-deal operating characteristics of state-owned banks involved as acquirers in M&A deals. We
build up a unique dataset of 3,682 deals between banks that allows us to classify M&As into four
categories, depending on the ownership of the acquirer and the target: 1) public re-organization
(deals between two state-owned banks), 2) publicization (a state-owned bank acquiring a private
bank) 3) privatization and 4) private re-organization (deals between two private banks). Our
findings confirms for the first time the IMH also for state-owned banks. We also find that state-
owned banks active as acquirers in the market for corporate control have a better pre-deal
performance compared to the private benchmark; this evidence is stronger for development banks.
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21. Introduction
The market for corporate control is the arena where alternative teams compete for the right to
manage corporate resources (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). When a bidding firm acquires a target
firm, the control rights are transferred to the board of directors of the acquiring firm and a new
team acquires the rights to manage the resources of the target firm. As many years ago it was
stated by Manne (1965) in a seminal paper, one of the most relevant feature of the market for
corporate control (MCC) is that it pursues competitive efficiency among corporate managers.
Given that competition can be used to remove inefficient and underperforming managers and to
replace them with better performing managers, this framework is often referred to as the
Inefficient Management Hypothesis (IMH). Competition for the control of companies plays a
disciplinary function that motivates managers to perform towards shareholder value maximization
(Grossman and Hart, 1981). The replacement of the incumbent management may be a source of
gains associated with profitability and operational efficiency improvements.  Therefore, indicators
of financial and accounting performance should contain explanatory power on the likelihood of
being acquired (Pilloff, 1996), i.e. the pre deal performance of acquirers is expected to be superior
to that of target firms.
This established theory on the MCC has never been tested for state-owned banks. The interest of
extending the analysis of the MCC to state-owned banks emerges by considering that, according to
our data, in the last ten years, 22% of M&A deals have involved state-owned banks, both as
targets (12%) and as acquirers (10%) (see Section 3). Moreover, state ownership in the financial
sector is still far from insignificant despite the waves of privatizations observed over the last
decades. State-owned banks account for 25% of the total asset of the banking system around the
world; in the European Union the share rises up to 30%, and is even higher in the BRIC countries,
i.e. Brazil Russia India and China (OECD 2012). In turn, financial companies account for 24% of
the assets of all SOEs, and they represent the second largest industry, after the network industries,
where government holdings are concentrated (OECD 2014).
According to traditional broad views about the rationales of government’s participation in
financial markets, state-owned banks are not wealth maximizers, as they may have alternative
goals, such as social (Gerschenkron, 1962; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Altman, 1993; Laffont and
Tirole, 1993; Stiglitz, 1993) or political purposes (Kornai, 1979; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2002; Carvalho, 2014). However,
in the last decade, state-owned banks have been reorganized, converted into limited liability
corporations and shareholder companies, subjected to the same accounting principles, corporate
governance practices and regulatory frameworks as private-owned banks (OECD 2012).
In such a changing environment, it seems interesting to ask whether those state-owned banks that
are active in the market for corporate control have characteristics and behaviors similar or different
to private banks active in the same market.  Such evidence would indirectly signal convergence of
managerial models.
To explore this issue we analyze M&A deals involving banks - both as targets and as acquirers -
during the last decade. In particular, we investigate the pre-deal operating performance and firm-
specific characteristics of state-owned banks that compete as acquirers in the market for corporate
control and highlight differences and similarities with deals performed by private banks. Are  the
performance of state-owned banks relative to their targets in the market for corporate control at
variance with the IMH?  Is there any difference in the pre-deal performance of state-owned banks
acting as acquirers in the market for corporate control compared to their private benchmark?
Which are the specificities – if any – related to the various type of deal the acquirer is involved in?
If the answer is such that the IMH is rejected for state-owned, but not for private banks, or the pre-
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would contribute to the view that state-owned banks, either because of their intrinsic inefficiency,
or because of their social objectives, are less performing and not contributing to the disciplinary
mechanism of the market for corporate control. Vice versa, if the IMH is valid also for
contemporary state-owned banks, and their performance is in line with their private benchmark,
this evidence may suggest an improvement in the operational mechanisms of this more dynamic
segment of the industry, involved in M&A deals.
In investigating the pre-deal performance of the acquirers, we also account for the different nature
of state-owned banks. Indeed, state-owned banks are made up of two main types of institutions:
commercial banks and development banks, which may be quite different in terms of mission,
business model, type of activity, targeted market segment. In fact, state-owned commercial banks
offer a wide variety of banking and financial services targeted to retail as well as corporate
customers, and covering deposits and accounts, credit cards, loans, stock-market services,
insurance, asset management etc.1. They behave similarly to private commercial banks and are in
some way direct competitors. After 2008, the number of state-owned commercial banks has
increased  because of the nationalization of some large groups, severely affected by the global
financial crisis. In Europe, between 2008 and 2013 Member States have granted an overall amount
of 448 billion Euro in recapitalization measures. Uk, Germany, Ireland and Spain are the countries
that mostly supported their banks, respectively with 100.14 billion, 64.17 billion, 62.78, 61.85.
Some examples of receiving banks from those countries are the Royal Bank of Scotland, Northen
Rock, Lloyds Banking Group, Barclays Bank (Uk), Hypo Real Estate Bank, Commerzbank,
Sparkasse KolnBonn, Nordbank (Germany), Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank (Ireland), Bankia
(Spain)2.
Development banks are something different. They have an explicit mandate to promote socio-
economic goals in a region, sector or specific market segment, and their core activity is to carry
out lending operations either directly to end-customers (so-called first-tier development banks) or
to other private financial institutions that in turn lend to end-customers (second-tiers development
banks) (World Bank, 2013). Development financial institutions are established both in emerging
countries, and in advanced economies: e.g. the Business Development Bank of Canada, Finnvera
(Finland), Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau KfW (Germany), KBN Kommunalbanken Norway
(Norway), Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego BGK (Poland), European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development EBDR (European Union), European Investment Bank EIB (European Union), Japan
Development Bank (Japan), and the recently established Green Investment Bank (UK). In the last
few years, development banks have been receiving growing attention given the countercyclical
role they played during the recent global financial crisis by increasing ther supply of credit to the
private sector while private banks experienced temporary difficulties (OECD 2012; World Bank
2011 and 2013).
State-owned banks are often considered a unique entity: in analyzing M&A deals we find
interesting differences in the pre-deal characteristics of these two types of banks.
To pursue our aim, a great effort has been done in collecting data for each deal performed between
2003 and 2013. We combine information from two database managed by Bureau Van Dijk:
Zephir,  on M&A deals, and Bankscope, on banks’ financial statements. This enables us to classify
1 For example, VTB Bank is one of the largest universal bank in Russia, and global provider of financialservices, active both in the mass market retail business and in the corporate-investment bankingbusiness, and offering a complete range of financial services; CIMB Bank is a large universal Malesyanbank, mainly operating in the Asia-Pacific area, in the business of consumer banking and wholesalebanking, with the ASEAN’s largest retail network.2 For detailed information about aids in the context of the economic and financial crises see State AidScoreboards (2014).
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re-organization: when a private bank acquires another private bank; 2) privatization, i.e. when the
target only is a state-owned bank; 3) publicization: when a state-owned bank acquires a private-
owned bank; 4) public sector re-organization: when both the acquirer and target banks are state-
owned; The combination of the two datasets allows to collect accounting and financial features of
both the acquirer and the target banks. The overall sample includes 3,682 deals occurred during
the period 2003-2013. Among state-owned acquirers, we also identify deals performed by
development banks and by state-owned commercial banks, by looking at the nature of each state-
owned bank in the dataset.
We first estimate a set of linear regression models in order to highlight how the ex-ante
performances of the acquiring banks are connected to their ownership. We then explore by another
set of models  the relationship between the type of deals and financial characteristics of the
dealers. Finally, with a linear regression model we test the IMH for state-owned banks.
We find that, in the last decade, M&A deals are consistent with the Inefficient Management
Hypothesis and the idea that better performing and efficient managers replace inefficient and
underperforming managers; this evidence is confirmed both for private acquirers and –
interestingly – for state-owned banks. As far as the pre-deal characteristics of the acquirers and the
role of ownership, we find that state-owned banks that are active in the market for corporate
control are more efficient then their private benchmarks, even controlling for other bank-specific
and deal-specific variables; results are stronger for development banks. A battery of robustness
tests confirm our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation of our
research and presents an overview of early literature on banks M&As and state-owned banks
performance. Section 3 describes our dataset. Section 4 highlights the research methodology while
the main results are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we finally provide some policy
implications and conclude.
2.Motivation
The IMH in the banking industry has been confirmed by a large body of empirical literature
analyzing stock market reactions, accounting measures of performance, and other bank-specific
characteristics of private-owned banks active on the market for corporate control as acquirers or
targets. The evidence highlights that more profitable and efficient banks tend to buy less profitable
and inefficient banks, supporting the hypothesis that acquisitions mainly transfer assets from
poorer to better management (Hernando et al, 2009; Evanoff and Ors, 2008; Cornett et al, 2006;
Hannan and Pilloff, 2009. Beccalli and Frantz, 2009; Campa and Hernando, 2006; Diaz et al,
2004; Altunbas and Marques, 2008; Hagendorff and Klasey, 2009; Beitel et al, 2004; Lel, Miller
2015; Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2007)
Up to the end of the last century, empirical research fails to find  consistent evidence regarding the
relationship between gains in performance, efficiency and shareholder wealth, and merger activity
(Berger et al. 1999 for a literature review). For example, Hannan and Rhoades (1987), probably
the first empirical paper testing the IMH on the banking sector, uses a sample of 1,046 Texas
banks in existence in 1970, of which 201 acquired during the period from 1971 to 1982, and tests
the hypothesis that acquisitions serve to drive out bad management by examining the relationship
between firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), and
the likelihood that the firm will be acquired. Their results provide no support for the notion that
poorly managed firms are more likely acquisition targets than other firms. Rhoades (1993) finds
similar results using a sample of  898 bank mergers from 1981 to 1986 involved in M&As; Linder
5and  Crane (1993) study the pre- and post-performance of all bank mergers in the New England
states between 1982 and 1987 and find that merging in banks did not achieve significant
improvements in operating profits relative to other banks. Conversely, Cornett and Tehranian
(1992), focusing on the pre-merger and post-merger operating performance and abnormal stock
returns of thirty financial institutions between 1982 and 1987, find that cash flow returns improve
following mergers compared to a peer group of banks that did not merge during that period.
Similarly, Pilloff (1996) examines 48 mergers occurring from 1982 to 1991 in the U.S. market.
The author analyzes both changes in the premerger and postmerger profitability, efficiency
balance sheet measures, as well as abnormal returns at the time of the merger announcement, and
find some results consistent with the notion that mergers increase efficiency. The reason of such
mixed findings in earlier literature is likely attributable to the time period being studied, since
M&As data were mainly from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, still an early stage in the
industry consolidation process (De Young et al. 2009).
Within the M&A literature, the majority of studies compare pre- and post-merger financial and
accounting performance. Only few studies focus on pre-deal characteristics of targets and
acquirers with the aim to shed light on firm-specific features of acquirers and on the hazard of
being acquired. Among them, Hannan and Pilloff (2009)  and Hernando et al. (2009) are the most
relevant. Hannan and Pilloff (2009) investigate the determinants of interstate and intrastate
acquisitions using a competing-risk proportional hazard model, where the type of acquirer,
classified according to location and size, defines the competing risks.  Their sample consists of
8117 banks observed over the period 1996-2005 and 1741 acquisitions divided in i) small and in-
market, ii) small and out-of-market, iii) large and in-market, iv) large and out-of-market.
Profitability is measured by ROA and inefficiency is measured by noninterest expenses divided by
the sum of noninterest income and net interest income. They find results consistent with the IMH
framework:  less profitable and more inefficient banks are more likely to be acquired. Hernando et
al. (2009) estimate through a multinomial logit model the differences between the banks that were
targets versus those that were not acquired in the EU-25 over the period 1997-2004. Their sample
contains of 1342 private banks and 157 deals, of which 39 were cross-border. They use three
proxies for the target’s operating performance: the return on average ratio, the cost to income ratio
and the net interest margin, and find that poorly managed EU-25 banks are more likely to be
acquired by other banks, broadly in line with the academic literature.
The above mentioned literature on the market for corporate control focuses only on deals
performed by private banks. To the best of our knowledge, no previous papers have focused on
deals performed by state-owned banks, nor on the pre-deals characteristics of state-owned
acquirers and on whether the IMH is violated by state-owned banks because of their specific
objectives. Our paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing state-owned banks as acquirers in the
market for corporate control.
Traditionally, state-owned banks are said to be less efficient and profitable than privately owned
banks, either because they pursue social objectives or because they are run by political
bureaucrats.
According to the social view - also referred to as development view and benign view - government-
owned banks contribute to economic development and improve general welfare. This view
underline the role of the public sector in compensating for market imperfections that leave socially
valuable investments underfinanced. Indeed, public banks are considered necessary for
substituting private intermediation in projects with positive social returns but negative private
returns, as well as to direct savings toward strategic long-term projects (Atkinson and Stiglitz
1980; Gerschenkron 1962). This role of state-ownership in banks is similar to the role of public
ownership in other industries, but the reasons for such ownership are sharper for financial
intermediation, where the social margin costs for the economy of systemic risks and bank failures
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Laffont and Tirole. 1993; Stiglitz. 1993). Conversely, according to the more skeptical political
view, state-owned banks are inefficient since they are mechanisms for pursuing the individual
goals of politicians, such as provide employment, financing favored enterprises, or transferring
resources to their supporters and political allies. Indeed, politicians create and maintain state-
owned banks in order to maximize their personal objectives rather than channeling funds to
socially efficient uses (Kornai 1979; Shleifer and Vishny. 1994; Shleifer and Vishny. 1997;
Frydman et al 1999; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1999; La Porta et al. 2002; Carvalho 2014).
In the last decade, empirical evidence from the strand of literature that analyze the issue of the
relationship between government ownership and bank performance is mixed. A body of evidence
are in line with traditional findings and highlights that state-owned banks are inherently less
efficient than private ones. Berger et al. (2005), using data from Argentina in the 1990s, find that
state-owned banks tend to have poorer performance relative to domestically-owned banks and very
high nonperforming loan ratios. Similar findings in Iannotta et al. (2007); using a sample of 181
large banks from 15 European countries over the 1999-2004 period the authors find that
government banks have lower profitability loan quality and higher insolvency risk compared to
private banks. Chen and Liu (2013) also report that government-owned financial institutions in
Taiwan have a return on assets lower than that of the average private institutions. Jiang et al
(2013), examining the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank
performances in China over the period 1995–2010, find that ownership structure matters to bank
performance and state-owned banks are associated with lower efficiency. Another body of
evidence, however, find different results. Cornett et al. (2009) use a pooled cross-sectional and
time-series regressions to investigate the effect of state-ownership on bank accounting
performance in 16 Far East countries from 1989 to 2004. They find that the performance of state-
owned banks is inferior to that of privately-owned banks; however, differences reduce over time,
probably because of increasing globalization of financial services competition that may have the
salutary effect of disciplining inefficient regulators and improving the performance of state-owned
banks. Micco et al (2007) analyze the relationship between bank ownership and performance for a
sample of banks that ranges from 5,465 in 1995 and 6,677 in 2002, for 179 countries across the
world, using standard indicators of bank profitability and efficiency. They find that state-owned
banks located in developing countries have much lower returns on assets than their private
counterparts; however, those located in industrialized countries are not significantly different from
their private counterparts. These results are in line with Altunbas et al (2008); the authors,
focusing on the German banking system, find little evidence that privately-owned banks are more
efficient than public banks, while the latter have slightly cost and profit advantages. Little
difference in state-owned and privately-owned banks performance is also find by Figuera et al.
(2009) using cross-sectional data over 20 countries.
In fact in recent years there has been a widespread tendency by governments to strengthen the
performance of state-owned banks by improving their governance. Poor governance of state-
owned banks - due to  the presence of weak board of directors subject to political pressures and to
managers lacking professional skills and experience - is considered to be one of the most relevant
explanation for their historical poor performance (OECD 2012).  A number of countries, although
far from being the totality, have undertaken important reforms to empower state-owned banks
boards, to shield them from political intervention and increase their autonomy, to enhance their
competence through skill based nomination processes (OECD 2005, 2011). Those global changes
potentially work in the direction to align the operational mechanisms of state- and private-owned
banks, facing similar issues and challenges.
The aim of our analysis, however, is more circumscribed.  We do not want to add another piece of
evidence to a wide traditional literature on the general question of state-owned versus private-
7owned bank performance. We  focus on a specific type of government-owned banks:  those who
are active as acquirers in the M&A arena, with both domestic and cross-border deals.
3. The dataset
3.1. Deals and ownership
Our sample consists of 3,682 M&A deals performed worldwide by banks over the period 2003-
2013. The dataset is obtained combining two sources of information, Zephyr and Bankscope3, both
from Bureau Van Dijk. We first collected the identification numbers of all the banks available in
Bankscope from 2003 to 2013 and we then matched these data with Zephyr. We obtained an initial
large dataset of M&A deals involving banks over the period 2003-2013; for each acquirer, vendor
and target involved in each deal, we then recorded, when available, information about type, year,
country, sectors (NACE Rev.2 code), and ownership (Global Ultimate Owner, GUO).4
The identification of the ownership of the bank was a crucial step in setting our database.  This
needed  to build up a logic algorithm. Since information about the firm’s GUO provided by
Zephyr refers only to the latest available year, rather than to the year when the deal occurred, when
defining the ownership type of any banks involved in the deal there is the possibility to wrongly
consider as state-owned (private-) a bank which is state-owned (private-) nowadays but that was
not state-owned (private-) at the time of the deal. This misreading may happen both on the
acquirer or the target side. To avoid this potential error we restricted our sample to those
observations where the ultimate owner of both the acquirer and the vendor has not changed since
the time of the deal 5 . To this aim, we have developed an algorithm to extract only those
observations where both the vendor and acquiring companies involved in a deal (at time t) do not
figure as target companies in a subsequent deal (at any time t+j).
The result of this selection procedure is sample of 3,682 observations (deals). At this stage, we
were able   use the information on the bank’s current ultimate owner. After identifying the
ownership, we finally matched these data with Bankscope to obtain – for each deal - accounting
information for the acquirer and for the target involved in each deal.
According to the ownership of the acquirer and the target, we identify four types of deals in
decreasing order of frequency in our sample
1) Private re-organization, when a private acquirer deals with a private target.
2) Privatization, when a private acquirer deals with a state-owned target;
3) Publicization, when a state-owned acquirer deals with a private target;
4) Public re-organization, when a state-owned acquirer deals with a state-owned target;
3 https://www.bvdinfo.com. Zephyr is a dataset that contains information about deals, while Bankscope is a database of
bank’s financial statements. Given our research question we matched both datasets.4 We consider as state-owned any bank whose ultimate owner, defined as the independent shareholder with the highest
direct or total percentage of ownership, is a central or local public entity, including public authorities, governments,
municipalities and local entities. Further, we consider this independent shareholder to be an ultimate owner (UO) of a
bank if it holds more than 25% of shares.
5 In order to ascertain the pre-deal ownership nature of the target, we look at the ownership type of the vendor, while we
look at the acquirer’s ownership to infer its post-deal ownership. In the rest of the paper we thus report information on
the ownership of target and acquirers.
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or target. As it happens, this share in terms of number of deals is not far from the share of public
banks in the industry (in terms of assets)  as estimated by the OECD (2012).
Tables 2-4 provide information on the number of deals and banks involved by year, by type of
ownership, and by geographical distribution. Table 3 compares the data between the pre-global
crisis years (20013-2008) and the more recent period 2009-2013.   M&As are split into the four
above mentioned categories according to the ownership of the acquirer and the target involved in
the deal. Deals are also split into domestic deals, when both the acquirer and the target are from
the same macro-geographic area, and cross-border deals, when the macro-geographic area of the
acquirer differs from that of the target. The main relevant trends are: a) the number of deals
increases after the 2008 crises (but in part this may reflect increased coverage by the Zephyr
database); b) over 60% of the deals overall are recorded in Europe (West and East), but in recent
years Eastern Europe and Central Asia record a stronger dynamism compared to Western Europe;
c) the large majority of deals are domestic, but a non-negligible 18% of the deals are cross-border.
As for our main research focus, the sample includes overall 441 privatizations, and 367 deals
where a state-owned bank is the acquirer (both of private or state-owned banks).
3.2 Characteristics of the banks and the IMH
As in Hannan and Pilloff (2009) and Hernando et al. (2009) we use two accounting measures of
operating performance6: a measure of efficiency and a measure of profitability. Efficiency is
measured with cost-to-income ratio, defined as operating costs divided by operating income: as
known, the higher the ratio, the lower the level of cost efficiency. Profitability is measured with
the return on asset (ROA), that is the ratio of profit before-tax to total assets7: the highest the ratio,
the highest the bank’s overall returns given its size. As previously discussed, the rationale is that
banks with higher profitability and efficiency may act as acquirers in the market for corporate
control in order to remove inefficient corporate managers.
In Table 5 we report sample means of banks characteristics across the different kinds of deal. The
descriptive statistics provide some preliminary evidence broadly in line with the literature on the
market for corporate control: on average both performance measures are consistent with the IMH,
and the idea that better performing and efficient managers replace inefficient and underperforming
managers.
As shown in Table 5, the ROA of the acquirers (1.14%) is on average higher than the ROA of the
targets (1.01%), either highlighting that acquirers are better managed and/or that acquirers can
achieve some sort of synergy by combining the assets of their bank with those of the target.
Evidences are even stronger for the cost-to-income measure of efficiency: on average, the
acquirer’s cost-to-income ratio is lower than that of the target (64.11% and 73.71%, respectively),
consistent with the idea that acquirers prefer target banks with opportunities for cost saving.
Acquirers have also a higher level of capitalization, as well as a better performing loan portfolio.
The size of the acquiring banks is always much higher than that of the target.
6 Our setting is similar to Hannan and Pilloff (2009) and Hernando (2009), since we focus on pre-deals banks’
characteristics and on accounting measures of performance. However, in the multivariate analysis we use a different
econometric specification since our research questions relate to banks involved in M&A deals, rather than banks’
probability of being involved in a deal.7 We use the return on assets (ROA), instead of the return on equity (ROE), since our sample is worldwide and ROA is
better-equipped in a cross-country analysis of banks with different levels of capitalization and leverage (Rivard and
Thomas 1997; Athanasoglou et al. 2008; Kosmidou 2008).
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depending on ownership: the above mentioned evidences are confirmed both for private acquirers
and – interestingly – for state-owned banks, although caution is needed as these descriptive
statistics do not control for potential covariates (see below).
The cost-to-income measure of performance supports the view that less efficient banks are
acquired by more efficient banks in all the four types of deal. There are however meaningful
differences suggesting that ownership does matter. Indeed, the value of the ratio is significantly
lower for state-owner acquirers compared to their private benchmarks; moreover, state-owned
banks acquire targets that are less efficient (in line with the IMH) but, at the same time, healthier
than targets acquired by private-owned banks.
The IMH is supported also when looking at the profitability measure. Indeed, the ROA of the
acquirer is higher than the ROA of the target both when the acquirer is a private-owned bank and
when the acquirer is a state-owned bank.  However, while the ROA of the acquirer is similar for
state-owned and private banks, data highlight that the ROA of the targets involved in public re-
organization deals is higher compared to targets of private acquirers. This evidence is interesting
since it highlights that state-owned banks involved in public re-organization deals are well
performing.
Furthermore, in the next section, dedicated to the empirical analysis, we propose a test for IMH
based on a linear regression model where the dependent variable, the difference in the
performance of target and acquirer, is modeled as a function of a set of controls and a dummy
variable discriminating between state-owned or private acquirers. The results, discussed in more
details in the next section, substantially confirm what found in the descriptive analysis, that the
IMH holds and is even stronger for state-owned acquirers8.
Summarizing, our sample has features in line with some standard findings of previous literature on
the pre-deal company characteristics in the market for corporate control. These findings are
consistent with the Inefficient Management Hypothesis, and  hold as well for state-owned banks
engaged in M&A deals.
3.3 Development versus commercial state-owned banks
In this descriptive section, we also investigate (Table 6) the different accounting profile of
development and commercial state-owned banks acting as acquirers in the market for corporate
control,  given that, as highlighted in the Introduction, these two groups of state-owned banks may
have different missions and business models, they may serve different target of customers and
offer different type of products and services. This focus may be helpful in understanding the
results of the empirical models. To the best of our knowledge, in traditional empirical analyses
state-owned banks are always treated as a unique entity, and no previous literature there exists
accounting for the different financial profile of those two groups of banks.
Within our sample, data highlight relevant differences between the two groups of state-owned
banks. Development banks are more efficient and more profitable than commercial state-owned
banks; their performance is also better than that of private banks. Specifically, the ROA of
development banks (2.05%) is four times the ROA of state-owned commercial banks (0.54%), and
it is almost double than that of private banks (1.14%). A similar relation holds for the efficiency
measure: the cost income ratio of development banks is lower compared to the others; within
commercial banks, state-owned banks highlight better efficiency than private banks. Interestingly,
8 Data are available from the authors upon request.
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data also display a better loan portfolio quality for development banks: the impaired loans to gross
loans ratio is 3.58% for development banks, while it is 5.20% for private banks and 9.16% for
commercial state-owned banks. This is in line with evidences from the World Bank (2013) that
highlight that on average the non-performing loan ratio of development banks is below the
national average9. As far as commercial state-owned banks, it is likely that the low quality of their
loan portfolios is burdened by non-performing loans of private banks rescued during the crisis.
Another interesting evidence is related to the level of the retail deposit to total funding ratio. This
ratio is a proxy of the retail activity of the bank on the liability side: the higher the ratio, the higher
the amount of funding raised by means of current account, saving deposits, and other types of
financial instruments typically offered by banks to retail customers. In our sample, the relative
weight of retail funding on the overall funding activity is similar for commercial state-owned and
private banks (respectively 74.4% and 69.6%), while it is much lower for development banks
(43.8%). Indeed, while commercial banks fund their business activity with a mix of different
sources, among which taking savings and deposits from the public, development banks mainly
raise funds by borrowing from other financial institutions or issuing debt (World Bank 2013).
Development banks have also a solvibility ratio, measured by the equity to total asset ratio, that is
more than two times that of commercial state-owned banks and higher than that of private banks.
On the overall, while commercial banks, both state-owned and private, have similar ratios,
development banks display different levels, thus highlighting the different nature of this type of
government bank.
Within such a context, we now move away from the descriptive statistics and the IMH and focus
on the characteristics of banks acting as acquirer in the market for corporate control
4. Research methodology
The empirical analysis aims at testing for any systematic difference in bank operating performance
that might be explained by differences in the ownership structure of banks involved as acquirers in
M&A deals. We first estimate a regression model to examine whether profitability and cost
efficiency vary across state-owned and private-owned banks acting as acquirer on the market for
corporate control. A second regression model will be also estimated in order to focus whether such
performance indicators are connected to the specific  type of deal the acquirer is involved in. We
finally test the IMH with a linear regression model.
4.1 Acquirer’s performance and ownership
The linear regression model we use is the following:
Pi =  + own owni + bs’ bsi + ds’ dsi + i (1)
where Pi is a measure of the performance of the acquirer i, owni is a dummy variable related to the
ownership of the acquirer, while bsi and dsi are vectors of control variables referring to bank and
deal characteristics, respectively. The term i is the usual error term. Although not explicitly
indicated for simplifying the notation, all explanatory variables refer to the year before the date of
the deal, in order to avoid endogeneity problems, and because we are interested in the firms’
characteristics before they merge.
9 Specifically, in 2009, 39% of development banks had a non-performing loan ratio higher than theirnational average, while 64% of development banks was below the national average; the percentage ofdevelopment banks with a better ratio was rising comparing to previous years.
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The performance of the acquirer is captured, alternatively, by the measure of efficiency (cost-to-
incomei) and the measure of profitability (ROAi) described in Section 3.2, as commonly discussed
in the literature. Our ownership structure is a dummy that equals to 1 if the bank is state-owned,
and zero otherwise (owni). We have already described in the detail the identification process of
ownership. The expected sign and magnitude of the coefficient related to the ownership variable
represent the main object of the investigation. Traditionally, state-owned banks are said to be less
profitable and efficient than private-owned banks. If this were true also for those state-owned
banks that engage in deals,  the coefficient sign should be therefore negative - as far as ROA - and
positive - as far as the cost-to-income ratio. If this is not the case, one may argue that state-owned
banks involved in M&A deals as acquirer are at least as performing and efficient as their private
benchmarks.
As control variables we use bank-specific variables for size, capitalization, type of activity, asset
quality. The log of total assets is the proxy of the bank’s size (TotAssetsi). Generally, the effect of
an increase in the size of the bank has been proved to be positive on profitability,  due to better
diversification opportunities and lower cost of funding of larger banks compared to smaller banks
(Molyneux and Thorton, 1992, Bikker and Hu, 2002; Goddard et al, 2004, Demirgug-Kunt and
Huizinga, 2000). However, other studies suggest that the positive effect of increased bank size on
profitability may be positive up to a certain limit, while beyond this point marginal cost savings
can be achieved by greater size (Athanasoglou et al 2008). In any case, introducing a control for
size is necessary to represent a crucial characteristic of the dealers.
Capitalization is measured by the equity-to-liabilities ratio (EqLiabi), which reflects the level of
bank’s protection against asset malfunctions. Bank leverage and capitalization have been analysed
in depth in previous literature, but empirical results vary significantly. The effect of bank
capitalization on profitability is generally found to be positive. An increase in capital reduces the
expected costs of bankruptcy; the lower likelihood of financial distress results in a lower cost of
funding, leading to a positive impact on bank profitability. Moreover, banks with relatively low
capital respond to moral hazard incentives by increasing the riskiness of their loan portfolio,
resulting in higher nonperforming loans on average in the future  (Molyneux and Thorton 1992,
Dermiguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2000, Goddard et al. 2004; Mehran, Thakor 2011) . However, there
are also findings of a negative relationship between profits and equity. A relatively high capital-
assets ratio could explain that a bank is operating over-cautiously, ignoring potentially profitable
diversification or other opportunities and using more equity, which is more expensive than debt
(Goddard et al. 2004, Angbazo 1997).
The type of banking activity is measured by the ratio of retail deposits to total funding
(DepTotFundi). This ratio captures the relative importance of traditional intermediation activity.
We also consider the ratio of net loans to retail funding (LoansRetFundi), an indicator that captures
the degree of liquidity of the bank. Asset quality is proxied by the non-performing loans to gross
loans ratio; the higher the ratio the poorer the quality of the loan portfolio (NPLoani). The effect of
credit risk on profitability is usually negative; the greater the exposure to high-risk loans, the
higher the accumulation of loan losses, as well as higher costs on loan monitoring does imply a
reduction in profitability (Miller and Noulas, 1997).
Moreover, as discussed in details in Section 3.3, there is a substantial difference between
development and commercial state-owned banks acting as acquirers in the market for corporate
control. In order to control for the difference nature of these two groups of banks, we include a
further dummy variable assuming value 1 for development banks acting as acquirers and 0
otherwise (Developmenti).
Finally, in order to control for country specific and time specific effects we include, as further
regressors collected in dsi, dummy variables for the macro area of the acquirer and for the year of
the deal.
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4.2 Acquirer’s performance and type of deal
In the second empirical analysis we want to examine whether operating performances vary
according to the four types of deal involving the acquirer bank, namely Public re-organization,
Publicization, Privatization, Private re-organization. The model, thus, can be written as:
Pi =  + PR PubReorgi + Pu Publi + Pr Privi +bs’ bsi + ds’ dsi + i. (2)
As before, Pi represents the performance of the acquirer (either ROA or cost-to-income ratio),
while the three dummies PubReorgi, Publi and Privi indicate Public re-organization, Publicization,
and Privatization, respectively. Being the most represented in our sample, Private re-organization
is chosen as the reference group. Moreover, in deals between private banks on both sides of the
transaction, there is no need to assume deviation from the objective of wealth maximization by the
managers. This offers a natural benchmark to read the estimated coefficients in terms of deviation
from an efficient behavior. The related coefficients PR , Pu and Pr indicate to what extent the
type of deal explains the performances of the acquirer. Likewise the previous model, a set of bank
specific (bsi) and deal specific (dsi) variables are included in the regression model; again, to
account for the different nature of state-owned banks we also add a dummy that equals 1 if the
acquirer is a development bank, and zero otherwise.
4.3 Bank performance, ownership and IMH
As already discussed in Section 3.2, we also provide a test for the Inefficient Management
Hypothesis (IMH). Based on a restricted sample, for which a sufficiently complete dataset is
available for both acquirer and target banks, we perform a linear regression model in which the
dependent variable is represented by the difference in the performance between the two actors of
the deal. In particular, we calculate the two indicators ARoa-TRoa and ACostIncome-TCostIncome
and perform a set of regressions for these two variables. The aim is to test whether the difference
between acquirer and target banks in terms of efficiency and profitability can be explained by
banks characteristics and, more important, by the ownership nature of the acquirer, measured by
the owni dummy variable previously discussed.
The specification of the model, thus, can be expressed as
PAi - PTi =  + own owni + bsA’ bsAi + bsT’ bsTi + i (3)
where PAi - PTi represents the difference between acquirers and targets in terms of efficiency and
profitability, owni is the dummy variable assuming value 1 for state-owned acquirers, while bsAi
and bsTi collect the bank-specific variables for the acquirers and the targets.
Without any control variable, a natural test for the IMH would be to check for a positive and
significant value for the constant term . However, as we will see in the results discussed in the
next section, given the important impact of bank-specific variables in explaining the difference in
the performances between acquirers and targets, the model cannot ignore such further explanatory
variables and the constant term loses its structural interpretation. However, focusing on the own
coefficient, it is possible to test whether such difference is higher, and in which direction, when the
acquirer is a state-owned bank. In particular, if we focus on the profitability of the banks (ARoa-
TRoa as dependent variable) and such coefficient is positive, it indicates that the performance of
the acquirer is better than the target when the acquirer is state-owned rather than private. An
opposite interpretation, instead, arises when the focus is on the efficiency of the banks
(ACostIncome-TCostIncome as dependent variable).
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5. Results
In this section we report a set of results obtained by estimating the linear regression models
presented in section 4. We distinguish according to the different models designed for explaining a)
the relationship between the performance of the acquirer and its ownership; b) the acquirer’s
performances and the kind of deal; c) the empirical evidence about the Inefficient Management
Hypothesis (IMH).
5.1 Acquirer’s performance and ownership
Table 7a and 7b report the results of the estimated regression model presented in Eq. (1). Our null
hypothesis is that the ownership of the acquirer bank plays no role, implying that state-owned
banks active on the market for corporate control have the same characteristics as their private
benchmarks in terms of efficiency and profitability. In Eq. (1), testing for this null hypothesis
corresponds to check for the significance of the coefficient own. Moreover, in the case of a
rejection, it becomes interesting to evaluate the sign and magnitude of the coefficient, in order to
shed light on the different characteristics of the acquiring banks in terms of efficiency and
profitability.
Table 7a presents the results of the estimated model when the cost-to-income ratio is the
dependent variable. In all the specifications, the coefficient of the ownership variable is negative
and always statistically significant at 1%. This finding suggests that state-owned banks that are
active in the market for corporate control are more efficient then private-owned banks active on
the same arena, even controlling for other bank-specific and deal-specific variables. The
coefficient is still significant when we distinguish between development and commercial state-
owned banks, and is stronger for development banks, whom indeed display higher levels of
efficiency.
These results may look surprising given the wide literature on the poorer performance of public
banks. However, this paper focuses on a sub-sample of state-owned banks, those who are active in
the market for corporate control. Indeed, it is likely that there is a self-selection of those banks,
that are more efficient and thus willing to compete as acquirers on the M&A arena. This result can
be read in the light that state-owned banks represent an heterogeneous world in which those
involved in M&A deals are the most dynamic in competing for the right to control resources.
The signs of the control variables that are statistically significant is coherent with the existing
empirical and theoretical literature; in particular, the size negatively affect inefficiency given the
positive role of economies of scales.10
Table 7b reports the estimated coefficients when the dependent variable is the ROA. In all the
specifications but for the first, the coefficient of the ownership variable is not statistically
significant, meaning that state-owned banks do not have a ROA significantly different from
private banks. The sign of the control variables are in line with expectations; in particular, the
impaired loans-to-gross loans ratio negatively affects bank performances, while the level of
capitalization has a positive impact.
10 Interestingly, but not reported here to save space, the crucial year of the Great Recession has a sign
positive and statistically significant for all the acquirers. Details can be provided by the authors upon
request.
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Interestingly, the sign of the development dummy variable is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that being a development bank has a negative impact on profitability measured by ROA,
even though the coefficient is very small. This result, that seems in contradiction with the previous
finding on the cost to income measure of performance, needs a further explanation, which lies in
the denominator of the ROA ratio, the total asset. In fact, although in the literature these two
accounting measures are commonly used as proxy of the bank operating performance and no
specific explanations are reported when the two results differ, they can be influenced by the type
of activity performed by the bank. The fact that we have distinguished between development
banks and commercial banks, and the deep look inside the dataset we use, help us to interpret these
results in a more robust way. Specifically, as highlighted in Section 1, because of their mission,
the core business of development banks is the supply of loans. This activity is on-balance sheet
and, thus, is entirely captured by the level of the total asset. Conversely, over the last decade the
traditional business of issuing loans by raising deposits has progressively declined in favour of a
significant growth in activities that are not captured on banks’ balance sheet, such as asset
management, brokerage, advisory and fiduciary services. These activities, loosely classified as off-
balance sheet, by definition are not included in the amount of the “Total asset”11. This implies that
for commercial banks, both state-owned and private, the ROA ratio compares income to a level of
total assets that is far below the real size of the bank activity and this, everything being equal,
reasonably explain why the more efficient development banks may have a level of ROA below
their less efficient benchmark.12
5.2 Acquirer’s performance and type of deal
Tables 8a and 8b report results designed to address the question of whether the characteristics (in
term of performances) of the acquirers are different according to the four types of deal they are
involved in. As far as the efficiency of the banks (Table 8a), captured by the cost-to-income
measure of performance, both types of deal performed by state-owned banks as acquirers have
statistically significant coefficients. Such negative and significant coefficients indicate that state-
owned banks acting in the arena are more efficient than private ones, and more specifically, the
most efficient ones seem to be those involved in public reorganization. All these results are robust
to all specifications and are stronger for development banks.
Moving to the profitability, measured by the ROA (Table 8b), the only type of deal that is
statistically significant is Public-reorganization: state-owned banks acquiring state-owned targets
have a higher ROA than all the other acquirers involved in M&A deals. This result, however,
weakens when controlling for the time effect, in which it emerges a positive and significant
coefficient for the first year of the global financial crisis when, probably, only the most profitable
banks (both private and state-owned) remain active on the M&A arena.13
5.3 Bank performance, ownership and IMH
In Section 4.3 we discussed about a test for the Inefficient Management Hypothesis (IMH) based
on a simple linear regression model when the difference between acquirer and target performances
are regressed on a constant term and some other control variable, as well as the dummy indicator
11 A recent strand of literature focuses on the impact of off-balance sheet activities on banks returns and
efficiency. See Calmés and Théoret 2010; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras 2014; Casu and Girardone 2005.12 The misalignment between the efficiency and the profitability measures of performance can also be driven
by the different specification of the denominator of the cost to income ratio (operating income) and
numerator of the Roa ratio (profit before taxes): the second accounts for depreciation and provision for loan
losses. However, in our sample this is not the case: indeed, as highlighted in Section 3.2, according to
literature (World Bank 2013) on average the quality of the loan portfolio of development banks is above the
national average, and descriptive statistics of our sample are in line with this finding.13 Details on the estimated time effects can be given by the authors upon request.
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for state-owned banks. The results for both the efficiency and profitability indicators are reported
in Table 9, for a sample in which data for acquirer and target banks are available.
In regressions (1) and (5), the significance of the constant term is a direct test on the substantial
higher performances for either the acquirer or target banks, depending on the sign. For both
indicators of performance, it emerges that on average the acquirers significantly perform better
than the targets. This effect is even stronger, although not significant, for state-owned acquirer
banks. However, when some other control variables are included, the constant term loses its
structural interpretation and becomes no more significant.
6. Robustness checks
6.1 Non-linear relations between performances and their determinants
In modelling bank performances, it is not unlikely that nonlinearity does emerge among the
variables involved in the analysis. In all regressions we searched for such potential non-linearities,
mainly considering interactions and/or polynomial relations. In all tables presented in the paper,
we report the unique form of non-linearity that significantly enters the results, i.e. the quadratic
effect of the dimension of the acquirer bank. In all cases, both the linear and quadratic effects are
significantly different from zero and of expected sign. In Tables 7a and 8a, focusing on the
efficiency of the acquirer, the linear coefficient is always negative, indicating that larger banks are
more likely to reduce the cost-to-income indicator, but when introducing the quadratic term it
emerges that such relation is not linear and the benefits of being large reduce as the dimension
increases. Similar results are obtained in Tables 7b and 8b, for the performance of the acquirers,
measured by the ROA before taxes.
6.2 Country cluster heterogeneity
In this second robustness exercise we ask whether the main results we found in terms of the
relations between bank performances, ownership and type of deal change when we restrict the
analysis to some homogeneous (for their nature) group of countries14. In particular we focus on 1)
Western EU countries, 2) OECD countries, 3) BRICST countries15, 4) developing countries and 5)
graduated developing countries16. For each of these groups we repeated our regression analysis
and compared the results.
In Tables 10a and 10b we show the estimated results for all clusters of countries when the
dependent variables are the cost-to-income indicator or the ROA indicator, respectively. Such
results should be compared to the corresponding estimates reported in Tables 7a and 7b, when all
countries were involved in the analysis.
In particular, focusing on the efficiency of the acquirer banks (Table 10a), it clearly emerges that
the main results are confirmed when restricting the analysis to Western EU countries, OECD
countries and BRICST countries, for which the coefficient of the state-own dummy variable is
negative and strongly significant. This results can be justified by the fact that in all these countries
institutions are much better compared to developing or graduated developing countries.
Furthermore, for these three groups of countries, the best efficiency has to be ascribed to state-
14 Details on the composition of this clusters con be obtained from the IMF or the World Bank websites.15 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Turkey.16 According to the IMF and the World Bank: Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan,Qatar, Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, San Marino, Croatia, Latvia,Lithuania.
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owned developing banks, being the coefficient of the associated dummy variable negative and
strongly significant.
In terms of the profitability of the acquirer banks (Table 10b), the results broadly confirm the
overall results reported in Table 7b, indicating that state-owned banks do not have a ROA
significantly different from private banks. Moreover, when restricting to Western EU and OECD
countries, the coefficient enters negatively the regression, indicating that private acquirers have a
higher profitability than state-owned ones. Such significant relations, however, disappear when we
introduce the distinction between development and commercial banks, confirming that the
differences may lie on the amount of activity that is captured by the denominator of the ROA ratio.
6.3 Performances, type of deal and development vs commercial banks
In many regressions we have obtained a clear different behavior between commercial and
development state-owned banks. In this section we go deeper and investigate the performances of
acquirer commercial or development state-owned banks involved in publicization or public
reorganization, when compared to similar private acquirers. The results, reported in Table 11,
confirm that, when observing the profitability, state-owned commercial banks involved in public
re-organization are characterized by higher performances compared to all others. Looking at the
efficiency, instead, development state-owned banks, involved in both public re-organization and
publicization have the best performances, although all state-owned banks perform better than
private ones.
6.4 Performances of acquirers involved in domestic or cross-border acquisitions
In a recent contribution, although in a slightly different context, Hernando et al. (2009) distinguish
between domestic and cross-border acquisitions. In our framework, we estimate a set of
regressions restricting the sample to either the domestic or cross-border deals. The results, not
reported here to save space, do not show any substantial difference across the two groups of deals
and confirm the overall results discussed in the previous sections. Further details can be obtained
from the authors upon request.
7. Policy implications and concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed M&A deals involving banks during the last decade with the aim to
investigate the pre-deal operating performance and firm-specific characteristics of state-owned
banks that compete as acquirers in the market for corporate control and to highlight differences
and similarities with their private benchmarks.
To this end we have constructed a novel dataset matching information from two databases
managed by Bureau van Dijk: Zephir, that collects data on deals, Bankscope, that collects data on
banks’ financial statements. We ended up with a sample of 3,682 M&A deals performed during
the period 2003-2013. Among state-owned acquirers we have also identify deals performed by
development banks and by commercial state-owned banks, given that the two groups of state-
owned banks may be quite different in terms of mission, business model, type of activity, targeted
market segment.
The theoretical framework is the market for corporate control and the Inefficient Management
Hypothesis, according to which alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to manage
corporate resources, removing inefficient and underperforming managers and replacing them with
efficient better performing managers.
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This theory has never been applied to state-owned banks, although they are increasingly active in
the M&A arena. One likely reason is that while private-owned banks are profit maximizing and
likely enter M&As that corroborate the IMH, state-owned banks are traditionally said to be less
efficient and profitable than private banks, either because they pursue social objectives or because
they are run by political bureaucrats. However, in the last decade empirical evidences are mixed,
suggesting that - at least - some state-owned banks are not inherently less efficient and profitable
than private ones. This can be due, among others, to reforms and changes that are going through
state-owned banks’ governance, regulation, and organization, which are aimed at strengthen their
performance (OECD, 2012). Those global changes may have aligned the operational mechanisms
of state- and private-owned banks, now facing similar issues and challenges.
Our first results is that the IMH  is confirmed when the acquirer is a state-owned bank. This is in
itself an interesting finding given that the IMH has never been applied to state-owned banks. Also
interesting is the finding that state-owned banks acquire targets – both state-owned and private -
that are healthier than those acquired by private-owned banks.
Estimating a linear regression model for the performances of the acquiring banks highlights that
state-owned banks that are active in the market for corporate control are significantly
outperforming compared to their private benchmark in terms of efficiency, even controlling for
other bank-specific and deal-specific variables. The result holds when we distinguish between
development and commercial state-owned banks, and is stronger for development banks. A battery
of robustness tests confirm our findings.
This paper contributes to keep alive the debate on state-owned banks from a new perspective:
looking to those banks which are active in the market for corporate control.  Indeed, while state-
owned banks are traditionally considered a unique entity characterized by poor performance, our
results point out that a sub-sample of state-owned banks, those who are active in the market for
corporate control, are at least as efficient and profitable than their private benchmark, and that
differences there exists between development and commercial banks, highlighting that state-
owned banks is an heterogeneous world that surely deserves further research to understand
features and evolution.
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Tables
Table 1. Deals by ownership of acquirer and target
Target
State-owned Private Total
Acquirer
State-
owned 111 (3%) 256 (7%)
367 (10%)
Private 441 (12%) 2,874 (78%) 3,315 (90%)
Total 552 (15%) 3,130 (85%) 3,682 (100%)
Source: Zephir and Bankscope Bureau van Dijk
Table 2. Number of deals by year and type of ownership
Year Nr of deals
Public Re-organization Publicization Privatization Private Re-organization Total
2003 1 3 3 30 37
2004 1 4 9 52 66
2005 - 9 7 36 52
2006 3 4 16 59 82
2007 6 13 27 90 136
2008 5 9 23 135 172
2009 10 28 50 338 426
2010 20 30 63 412 525
2011 28 49 84 531 692
2012 17 56 101 683 857
2013 20 51 58 508 637
Total 111 256 441 2874 3682
Source: Zephir and Bankscope Bureau van Dijk
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Table 3. Number of deals by macro-geographic area and type of ownership
Macroarea
Public re-
organization Publicization Privatization
Private re-
organization Total
2003-
2008
2009-
2013
2003-
2008
2009-
2013
2003-
2008
2009-
2013
2003-
2008
2009-
2013
Africa 1 10 - 8 1 13 4 47 84
Eastern Europe 2 22 6 41 12 86 30 390 589
Far East & Central
Asia 2 13 2 39 9 34 27 327 453
Middle East - 3 1 9 - 7 5 41 66
North America - 2 1 5 3 57 82 394 544
Oceania - - - - - 2 1 31 34
South & Central
America - 1 1 7 4 11 11 94 129
Western Europe 6 41 19 87 56 141 231 1074 1655
Total (*) 11 92 30 196 85 351 391 2398 3554
Source: Zephir and Bankscope Bureau van Dijk. (*) Totals are different since not all the data have information about
country variable
Table 4. Number of domestic and cross-border deals (acquirers)
Number of deals
Macroarea Domestic Cross-borderAfrica 66 18Eastern Europe 574 15Far East & Central Asia 418 35Middle East 43 23North America 354 190Oceania 17 17South & Central America 102 27Western Europe 1,328 327Total (*) 2,902 652
Breakdown by year of the deal2003 22 152004 50 162005 41 112006 66 162007 103 332008 134 382009 354 722010 435 902011 556 1362012 663 1942013 508 129Total (*) 2,932 750
Sources: Zephyr (BvD) and Bankscope (BvD); (*) Totals are different since not all the data have information about
country variable
24
Table 5. Summary statistics of acquirers and targets (mean values)
Public re-
organization Publicization Privatization
Private re-
organization Total
Roa (A) 1.41 1.25 1.46 1.10 1.14
Roa (T) 1.28 1.10 0.81 1.02 1.01
Cost to income ratio (A) 44.76 51.59 61.71 67.66 64.11
Cost to income ratio (T) 60.87 63.21 70.51 76.00 73.71
Impaired loans / Gross loans
(A) 8.51 5.21 4.63 5.29 5.45
Impaired loans / Gross loans
(T) 6.73 7.33 6.51 6.27 6.39
Retail deposit / Total funding
(A) 69.79 55.54 75.59 68.63 67.91
Retail deposit / Total funding
(T) 77.76 78.03 81.38 72.25 74.20
Net loans / Retail funding (A) 107.05 118.70 72.85 89.32 91.80
Net loans / Retail funding (T) 121.48 89.48 88.99 107.99 104.45
Equity / Total asset (A) 13.27 19.30 14.17 14.70 15.12
Equity / Total asset (T) 14.33 14.49 13.13 14.16 14.04
Total Asset (A) 80,913,837 143,718,644 156,525,655 153,297,489 149,014,145
Total Asset (T) 29,343,817 59,286,393 26,343,277 18,643,490 23,318,067
Nr obs 109 250 441 2.874 3.674
Source: Zephir and Bankscope Bureau van Dijk
Table 6. Summary statistics of acquirers: development banks, commercial state-owned banks,
private banks (mean values)
Development
banks
Commercial
state-owned
banks Private banks Total
Roa 2.05 0.54 1.14 1.17
Cost to income ratio 40.15 59.19 66.88 64.09
Impaired loans / Gross loans 3.58 9.16 5.20 5.38
Retail deposit / Total funding 43.78 74.40 69.55 67.81
Net loans / Retail funding 149.62 80.68 87.03 91.97
Equity / Total asset 23.96 11.11 14.63 15.10
Total Asset 104,196,265 151,479,376 153,722,340 149,515,249
Nr obs 90 89 889 1,068
Source: Zephir and Bankscope Bureau van Dijk
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Table 7a. OLS regression for performance and ownership (Dependent Variable – Cost to
Income ratio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Own (=1 state owned) -19.26*** -17.98*** -18.36*** -17.23*** -15.86*** -13.75*** -6.13**
(2.32) (2.31) (2.27) (2.30) (2.28) (2.18) (2.93)
Development -15.45***
(4.02)
TotAssets -1.88*** -2.56*** -3.44*** -3.15*** -3.41*** -41.88*** -39.90***
(0.40) (0.43) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (4.44) (4.43)
TotAssets2 1.15*** 1.09***
(0.13) (0.13)
DepTotFund -0.04 -0.10** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.22*** -0.27***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
NPLoans 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.07
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
AEq_TotLiab -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.11** -0.08* -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
LoansRetFund -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Macroarea Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 98.50*** 116.88*** 153.27*** 148.05*** 145.52*** 451.55*** 439.48***
(8.45) (9.52) (10.74) (10.72) (13.45) (37.41) (37.16)
Observations 702 702 694 690 690 690 690
R-squared 0.128 0.148 0.186 0.238 0.276 0.350 0.364
Note: Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7b. OLS regression for performance and ownership (Dependent Variable - ROA
before taxes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Own (=1 state owned) 0.48** 0.13 0.14 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.43
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.28)
Development -0.81**
(0.38)
TotEquity -0.03 0.07 0.09** 0.13*** 0.12*** 1.88*** 1.88***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.45) (0.45)
TotEquity2 -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02)
DepTotFund -0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
NPLoans -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AEq_TotLiab 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LoansRetFund 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Macroarea Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.21** -0.78 -1.71* -1.98** -1.54 -13.30*** -13.07***
(0.86) (0.82) (0.93) (0.92) (1.11) (3.16) (3.15)
Observations 718 718 712 708 708 708 708
R-squared 0.093 0.252 0.256 0.310 0.356 0.371 0.375
Note: Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8a. OLS regression for performance and type of deal (Dependent Variable – Cost to
Income ratio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Privatization (dummy) -1.02 -0.45 -1.11 -2.50 -2.53 -1.62 -1.62
(2.76) (2.73) (2.65) (2.62) (2.59) (2.46) (2.44)
Publicization (dummy) -17.80*** -16.19*** -16.99*** -15.74*** -14.31*** -12.71*** -5.02
(2.73) (2.73) (2.69) (2.70) (2.67) (2.55) (3.21)
Public re-organization (dummy) -22.77*** -21.92*** -21.60*** -21.28*** -20.06*** -16.60*** -9.07**
(3.80) (3.77) (3.66) (3.64) (3.60) (3.44) (3.92)
Development -15.50***
(4.02)
TotAssets -1.86*** -2.55*** -3.42*** -3.11*** -3.35*** -41.48*** -39.48***
(0.40) (0.43) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (4.46) (4.44)
TotAssets2 1.14*** 1.08***
(0.13) (0.13)
DepTotFund -0.03 -0.09** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.22*** -0.26***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
NPLoans 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.08
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
AEq_TotLiab -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.11** -0.08* -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
LoansRetFund -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Macroarea Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 97.76*** 116.18*** 152.44*** 146.80*** 144.08*** 447.68*** 435.46***
(8.49) (9.53) (10.78) (10.75) (13.47) (37.57) (37.32)
Observations 702 702 694 690 690 690 690
R-squared 0.130 0.150 0.188 0.241 0.279 0.351 0.365
Note: Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8b. OLS regression for performance and type of deal (Dependent Variable – ROA
before taxes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Privatization (dummy) 0.41 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.26 0.21 0.21
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Publicization (dummy) 0.30 -0.10 -0.08 -0.15 -0.20 -0.12 0.27
(0.27) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30)
Public re-organization (dummy) 1.05*** 0.79** 0.77** 0.63* 0.53 0.47 0.87**
(0.38) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.38)
Development -0.82**
(0.38)
TotEquity -0.03 0.07 0.09* 0.12*** 0.11** 1.79*** 1.79***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.45) (0.45)
TotEquity2 -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02)
DepTotFund -0.01 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
NPLoans -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AEq_TotLiab 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LoansRetFund 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Macroarea Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.30*** -0.67 -1.56* -1.82** -1.28 -12.50*** -12.28***
(0.86) (0.82) (0.93) (0.92) (1.11) (3.19) (3.18)
Observations 718 718 712 708 708 708 708
R-squared 0.100 0.259 0.262 0.315 0.361 0.374 0.378
Note: Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9. OLS regression for Inefficient Management Hypothesis (balanced sample;
Dependent Variable – AROA-TROA and Acost_income-Tcost_income)
Aroa – Troa Acost_income - Tcost_income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Own (=1 state owned) 0.51 0.69 0.60 -5.49 -4.90 -2.09
(-0.52) (0.72) (0.76) (5.63) (5.74) (5.98)
A_equity 0.04 0.13 -0.13 -0.76
(0.18) (0.18) (1.46) (1.45)
T_equity 0.11 0.10 0.25 1.50
(0.15) (0.16) (1.23) (1.27)
A_DepTotFund -0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.16)
T_DepTotFund 0.00 0.03 -0.10 0.30
(0.01) (0.03) (0.12) (0.20)
A_NPLoans -0.18*** -0.15*** 0.89** 0.76*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.41) (0.41)
T_NPLoans 0.10*** 0.10*** -0.70** -0.80***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (0.27)
A_EqLiab 0.05 -0.28
(0.04) (0.30)
T_EqLiab -0.09** 0.75**
(0.04) (0.33)
A_LoansRetFund 0.01 -0.08
(0.01) (0.09)
T_LoansRetFund 0.02 0.25**
(0.01) (0.10)
Constant 0.34* 0.24 -1.54 -7.50 -9.81*** -8.81*** -12.19 -60.58
(0.20) (-0.22) (3.17) (4.62) (2.18) (2.41) (25.97) (37.31)
Observations 253 253 159 157 235 235 151 150
R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.128 0.176 0.000 0.004 0.085 0.175
Note: Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10a. Robustness: OLS regression for performance and ownership for different groups of countries (Dependent Variable – Cost to
Income ratio)
Westernd EU countries OECD countries BRICST countries Developing countries Graduated Developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Own (=1 state owned) -8.19** -7.14** 4.48 -15.18*** -14.07*** -0.51 -10.88 -18.12** -3.35 -2.86 -8.88 1.28 2.83 -3.61 -6.53
(3.34) (3.36) (4.58) (2.78) (2.72) (4.15) (8.86) (8.20) (10.81) (5.84) (6.89) (9.75) (7.52) (6.22) (6.64)
Development -22.37*** -21.69*** -25.85** -18.54 28.29
(6.13) (5.08) (12.81) (12.72) (22.97)
TotAssets -2.67*** -19.41** -12.34 -2.81*** -30.58*** -27.97*** -7.91*** -70.57*** -57.59*** -4.37*** -26.26* -10.86 -6.01** -125.10*** -126.29***
(0.75) (8.41) (8.46) (0.53) (5.43) (5.37) (2.02) (17.16) (17.86) (1.06) (13.85) (17.29) (2.44) (19.73) (19.68)
TotAssets2 0.49** 0.28 0.82*** 0.74*** 2.00*** 1.59*** 0.68 0.20 3.76*** 3.81***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.54) (0.57) (0.43) (0.53) (0.62) (0.62)
DepTotFund -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.36*** -0.32*** -0.27*** -0.32*** 0.04 0.06 -0.03 -0.14 -0.20 -0.22 0.03 0.07 0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) (0.30) (0.30) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.27) (0.22) (0.22)
NPLoans 0.29 0.29 0.13 0.14 0.17 -0.02 2.66** 3.49*** 3.25*** -1.25*** -0.97*** -1.20*** 0.18 0.34 0.35
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (1.10) (1.02) (0.99) (0.30) (0.34) (0.37) (0.43) (0.35) (0.35)
AEq_TotLiab -0.49*** -0.48*** -0.36*** -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.17 -0.14 -0.06 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.22 -0.15 -0.13
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18)
LoansRetFund -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05* -0.05* -0.06** -0.17 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Macroarea Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 136.40*** 273.38*** 221.73*** 134.82*** 361.66*** 345.17*** 201.69*** 692.40*** 595.71*** 163.15*** 344.65*** 218.64 131.65** 1,030.59*** 1,035.15***
(20.17) (71.39) (71.33) (14.88) (46.50) (45.85) (47.89) (140.35) (144.47) (30.07) (118.31) (145.36) (49.97) (153.69) (153.17)
Observations 306 306 306 504 504 504 69 69 69 63 63 63 90 90 90
R-squared 0.349 0.358 0.387 0.257 0.296 0.322 0.543 0.638 0.666 0.641 0.660 0.675 0.498 0.671 0.678
Note: Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10b. Robustness: OLS regression for performance and ownership for different groups of countries (Dependent Variable – ROA before
taxes)
Westernd EU countries OECD countries BRICST countries Developing countries Graduated Developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Own (=1 state owned) -0.80*** -0.82*** -0.58 -0.64*** -0.61*** -0.45 -0.90 -0.30 0.43 -0.46 -0.05 -1.05 0.87 1.04 1.19
(0.31) (0.31) (0.41) (0.20) (0.20) (0.30) (0.70) (0.68) (0.88) (0.79) (0.92) (1.21) (0.85) (0.87) (0.93)
Development -0.48 -0.25 -1.34 2.05 -1.55
(0.56) (0.37) (1.03) (1.63) (3.27)
TotEquity 0.01 -1.29 -1.27 0.10** 1.03** 1.03** 0.40** 4.81*** 5.23*** 0.11 2.01 0.46 0.33 3.51 3.60
(0.07) (0.88) (0.88) (0.04) (0.40) (0.40) (0.16) (1.47) (1.50) (0.16) (2.17) (2.48) (0.29) (2.96) (2.98)
TotEquity2 0.04 0.04 -0.03** -0.03** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 -0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
DepTotFund -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.05** 0.05** 0.06** 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
NPLoans -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.19** -0.26*** -0.27*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
AEq_TotLiab 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.05** 0.05** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LoansRetFund 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Macroarea Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.79 10.02 9.90 -0.85 -7.28** -7.25** 0.29 -29.33*** -31.95*** -5.69 -19.66 -9.69 -10.82** -30.50 -30.80
(1.94) (6.48) (6.48) (1.02) (2.93) (2.93) (3.51) (10.34) (10.47) (4.14) (16.40) (18.25) (5.16) (18.91) (19.03)
Observations 321 321 321 519 519 519 69 69 69 63 63 63 93 93 93
R-squared 0.362 0.367 0.369 0.550 0.555 0.555 0.573 0.638 0.650 0.299 0.311 0.335 0.562 0.569 0.571
Note: Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11. Robustness: OLS regression for performance, typo of deal and commercial vs
development banks (Dependent Variable – ROA before taxes and Cost to Income ratio)
ROA before taxes Cost to income
(3) (4) (5) (6) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Privatization 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.21 -0.99 -2.37 -2.48 -1.64
(0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (2.62) (2.57) (2.55) (2.44)
Publicization-Commercial 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.25 -6.71* -2.33 -2.53 -3.84
(0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (3.68) (3.70) (3.65) (3.49)
Publicization-Development -0.22 -0.37 -0.57* -0.53 -27.19*** -28.18*** -25.73*** -21.56***
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (3.62) (3.55) (3.57) (3.45)
PubReorg-Commercial 1.18** 1.11** 1.03** 0.92* -16.48*** -15.02*** -14.35*** -11.40**
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (5.03) (5.01) (4.96) (4.75)
PubReorg-Development 0.33 0.15 0.01 0.00 -27.09*** -27.60*** -25.98*** -22.36***
(0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) (5.10) (4.96) (4.92) (4.72)
ln_Aequity 0.09* 0.12*** 0.11** 1.79*** -3.58*** -3.27*** -3.43*** -39.19***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (4.46)
ln_Aequity2 -0.06*** 1.07***
(0.02) (0.13)
A_stdep_totliq 0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.27***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
A_Il_Gloan -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
AEq_TotLiab 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.10** -0.08* -0.07* -0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
A_NL_DepStFund 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.47 -1.71* -1.08 -12.26*** 160.60*** 155.57*** 149.74*** 433.40***
(0.94) (0.93) (1.12) (3.19) (10.82) (10.66) (13.30) (37.40)
Observations 712 708 708 708 694 690 690 690
R-squared 0.264 0.317 0.365 0.378 0.209 0.272 0.304 0.366
